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Abstract
Inequality has risen in many countries over the last two decades, especially in the transition
economies, but also in many developing and developed economies. This is disturbing since
little progress can be made in poverty reduction when inequality is high and rising.
Moreover, contrary to earlier theories of development, high inequality tends to reduce
economic growth, and therefore poverty reduction through growth. This paper finds
evidence of a concave relationship between inequality and growth: growth can be low (or
negative) at low levels of inequality (due to disincentive effects) and low (or negative) at
high levels of inequality (due, for instance, to the depressing effect on private investment
of the social conflict associated with high inequality). 'Traditional' sources of inequality
must be addressed through land reform, and more public spending on the human capital of
the poor. But new causes of rising inequality must also be tackled by: redesigning
stabilization programmes to avoid sharp anti-poor demand compression and to protect pro-
poor spending; regulation of privatized enterprises to protect disadvantaged poor
consumers; and more pro-poor education investment to offset the tendency of trade
liberalization to increase income inequality.
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I. Introduction
The last decade has seen an increasing focus on poverty reduction. Yet, inequality has risen
in many countries over the last two decades, especially in the transition economies and also
in the emerging and developed economies (Table 1, Cornia with Kiiski, 2001; Atkinson,
1999; Kanbur and Lustig, 1999). This new evidence overturns the conclusion of some
authors (Li et al., 1998) that the long-term distribution of income within countries is stable.
Table 1
Summary of changes in income inequality in 73 countries from the 1960s to the 1990s















































A l l 1 73 42 2 7 3
Source: Giovanni Andrea Cornia with Sampsa Kiiski (2001) ‘Trends in Income Distribution in the Post-World
War II Period: Evidence and Interpretation’, WIDER Discussion Paper No. 89, UNU/WIDER: Helsinki.
Notes: The length of the time series and the number of observations about income inequality varies from
country to country. In the countries underlined, very recent information (not yet included in the WIID) suggests
that income inequality may have risen over from 1998-2000; i.e. in the wake of the recent wave of financial
crises.2
Some economists and policymakers are unperturbed by inequality’s rising trend. Greater
income concentration is seen as a source of greater incentives and faster capital
accumulation—thus raising growth and income for all, including the poor—and as an
opportunity for social mobility by disfavoured minorities. In societies undergoing rapid
change, the transition economies especially, rising income inequality is seen as an
unavoidable side effect of much needed privatization and liberalization and, more
generally, as the result of the unwinding of socialism’s compression of incentives.
Over the last decade, the Washington Consensus has increasingly focused on poverty
reduction. But inequality has been mostly ignored; possibly because it raises
uncomfortable questions about the social impact of Bank and Fund programmes. The
Bretton Woods Institutions therefore cling to the view that poverty reduction can be
achieved mainly through economic growth, the targeting of basic social services to the
poor, and social safety nets. For sure, economic growth is very important. But, this
perspective has its flaws. Poverty reduction through growth is limited when income and
asset inequality are high; growth is then concentrated in a few groups, bypasses poor
smallholders and microentrepreneurs, and creates little employment for the unskilled. It is
not surprising, for example, that Latin America’s poor have derived so little benefit from
its periods of growth. Growth must be very fast indeed to achieve any poverty reduction
when a society exhibits both high initial inequality and rising inequality.
Moreover, the traditional view that inequality is good for growth (and thus for poverty
reduction through growth) is increasingly challenged, starting with the influential paper of
Galor and Zeira (1993) (see Ferreira, 1999; Aghion et al., 1999; and Benabou, 1996 for
literature reviews). New approaches also highlight the negative growth effects of the nexus
between high and rising ‘horizontal inequality’ (i.e inequality among social groups),
political instability and the risk of civil conflict (Nazfiger et al., 1999). And different
reform strategies yield different patterns of growth, some more equitable than others
(Addison and Demery, 1993; Cornia et al., 1987).
In summary we ignore high inequality and rising inequality at our peril. Although inequality
raises many contentious issues—including land reform, progressive taxation, and core
development strategy—little progress can be made in poverty reduction when inequality is
high and rising. This paper discusses how we can achieve faster poverty reduction by means
of policies that have, directly or indirectly, income distribution effects. The paper begins, in
section II, by placing the issues in the context of recent trends in poverty and the DAC
targets for poverty reduction. This opens up the question of the relationship between
inequality, growth and poverty—if inequality is high then the DAC poverty reduction targets
will be much harder to achieve. We then pursue this issue further in section 3 with an
assessment of the main theories of the inequality-growth linkage. This sets the scene for our
outline of an analytical framework in section 4, and an empirical analysis of this relationship
in section 5. Finally, we conclude (section 7) by summarising some of the current gaps in the
policies towards income inequality in the Washington Consensus.
2. Rising inequality and slow poverty reduction
The widespread increase in inequality will prove detrimental to the achievement of the
poverty reduction objectives adopted by the international community in the late 1980s and3
early 1990s. Large increases in inequality stifle growth and make it harder to achieve
poverty reduction through growth.
The World Development Report 1990 (World Bank, 1990) projected that the total number
of the poor (defined as people surviving on less than PPP$1 per day) would have fallen
from 1125 to 825 million between 1985 and 2000 (Table 2). Yet, the Bank’s recent
assessments for years both before and after the Asian crisis indicate that the original target
will be missed by a wide margin. The number of poor worldwide was estimated at 1.214
million in 1998, and is expected to have approached almost the 1300 million mark in 2000.
If China is removed from the total (last line of Table 2), the results appear even less
satisfactory both in terms of poverty incidence—that declines between 1987 and 1998 by
only 2.3 percentage points (or by an average of only 0.2 percent a year)—and the absolute
number of the poor (that increases by 100 million). At such a pace, the DAC poverty
targets for these countries will be reached around 2060 rather than around 2015.
Table 2
Estimated absolute number of the poor and poverty rates (in parentheses)






















E. Asia 280 (20.4) 415 (26.6) 452 (27.6) 432 (25.2) 265 (14.9) 278 (15.3) 70 (4.0)
EE/FSU 5 (7.8) 1 (0.2) 7 (1.6) 18 (4.0) 23 (5.1) 24 (5.1) 5 (7.9)
L .A m e r i c a 7 5( 1 9 . 1 ) 6 4( 1 5 . 3 ) 7 4( 1 6 . 8 ) 7 1( 1 5 . 3 ) 7 6( 1 5 . 6 ) 7 8( 1 5 . 6 ) 6 0( 1 1 . 4 )
MENA .... 25 (11.5) 22 (9.3) 21 (8.4) 21 (7.8) 21 (7.3) ...
South Asia 525 (50.9) 474 (44.9) 495 (44.0) 505 (42.4) 505 (40.1) 522 (40.0) 365 (26.0)
SS Africa 180 (46.8) 217 (46.6) 242 (47.7) 273 (49.6) 289 (48.5) 291 (46.3) 265 (43.1)
Total 1125 (32.7) 1196 (28.7) 1293 (29.3) 1320 (28.5) 1180 (24.3) 1214 (24.3) 825 (18.0)
Total w/o China ... 891 (29.6) 916 (29.3) 955 (28.5) 960 (27.3) 991 (27.3) ....
Source: World Bank (1990, 1999).
Note: 1985 and 2000 figures are not entirely comparable with those for 1987-98 due to some changes in
country groupings and the definition of poverty line, defined as $370 a year in World Bank 1990 and $365 a
year in World Bank 1999.
Poverty rates rose faster than expected, on the basis of output contraction, in most of the
states of the former Soviet Union where inequality escalated sharply. In Africa the share of
the poor remained broadly constant over 1987-98 while the number of the poor rose by 74
million owing to output stagnation and the persistence of high inequality. In Latin America
the poverty rate stagnated and the number of the poor rose by 14 million despite a moderate
rise in output per capita. These results are even more dramatic when it is noted that during
this period growth in these two regions has been faster than during the first seven years of the
1980s. Indeed, a comparison of the 1998 poverty estimates (Table 1) with those of 1980
would show for these two regions much greater rises in poverty. In China, the number of
poor people declined very rapidly between 1978 and the mid 1980s, fell slowly or even
stagnated between 1987 and 1993, and declined massively over 1993-6 (despite the
population increasing by over 20 million people a year) because of sustained growth and a
marked improvements in the terms of trade of agriculture. However, the sharp increase in
inequality that began in the 1990s, has slowed progress on the poverty front despite
continued high output growth.4
What are the reasons for these mainly unsatisfactory results? The extent of poverty reduction
is influenced by the observed changes in growth performance and income distribution.
Formally, one can show that, given a constant poverty line (z), the change over time in the
poverty headcount ratio ( PHR D ) can be decomposed into a percentage change in mean
income (DGDP/c), a percentage change in its distribution (DGini) and an interaction term
(IT):
(1)            DPHR = - DGDP/c + DGini + IT
In this framework, as shown in Figure 1, for any given GDP/capita (G*), poverty reduction is
maximized if policies are able to reduce income inequality to its lowest feasible level (Gini=
25, for example, in Figure 1).
Countries with high inequality which wish to target the poverty rate PHR* while avoiding
any redistribution can do so by speeding up their distributionally neutral growth rate, so as
to move from GDP/c1 to GDP/c2. Achieving faster growth, however, may be impossible
due to environmental, trade or financing constraints. Pushing growth above its
environmentally sustainable rate will only reduce poverty temporarily, since eventually it
depletes the natural capital that supports livelihoods. Similarly, the country may face
restrictions on faster export-led growth (e.g. northern protectionism in competing
agricultural products). And investment in excess of domestic savings, to support fast
growth, will require external financing that may not be forthcoming, especially for poorer
countries.
The experience of the developing countries in the field of inequality, growth and poverty
reduction over the last 10-15 years is summarized in Table 3. The table shows that poverty
rates rose in 43 percent of the cases (due to falling average income per capita and
worsening inequality) and declined sharply (at 9.6 percent a year on average) in 27 percent
of the cases due to rising income per capita and declining inequality. It also shows also that
rises in income per capita per se do little to reduce poverty if they are accompanied by a
surge in inequality. In these cases, the poverty rate almost stagnated (upper right quadrant).
Table 3
Changes in poverty rates in 117 growth spells covering 47 developing countries over the
1980s and 1990s
Average Household Income Per Capita
Falling Rising
Rising
(17 percent of cases)
poverty rising at 14.3% per
year
(30 percent of cases)




(26 percent of cases)
poverty rising at 1.7% a
year
(27 percent of cases)
























That successful poverty alleviation depends not only on favourable changes in average
GDP per capita growth but also on favourable changes in income inequality is
demonstrated as well by country examples (Table 4). In Brazil, in spite of an increase in
incomes per capita, poverty stagnated over the 1980s as a result of an increase in inequality
from already high levels. In Cote d’Ivoire, in contrast, the recession induced a steep rise in
poverty over 1985-8 that was partly compensated for by an improvement in the rural-urban
income distribution. Finally, in Bulgaria poverty increased over 1991-3 by much more than
could be predicted by the average fall in per capita income, because of a sharp rise in
inequality.
Table 4
Decomposition of changes in poverty over time into changes in mean income and












Brazil 1981-8 0.01 -4.49 4.46 0.04
Cote d’Ivoire 1985-8 15.90 16.90 -6.00 5.00
Bulgaria 1991-3 8.10 0.90 6.60 0.60
Source: McKay (1997).
Notes: (1) negative values denote reductions in poverty, positive one, increases. (2) The residual is due to the
fact that the sum of the changes in mean incomes and in income distribution does not equal the change in
poverty (see Datt and Ravallion, 1992).
Unless reversed, current inequality trends will continue to reduce the poverty alleviation
elasticity of growth and, as discussed in the subsequent section, may depress economic
growth itself. This will in turn make it virtually impossible to meet the DAC target for
reducing the incidence of poverty to 15 percent by 2015. At the moment, the World Bank
estimates that income per capita in the developing countries will grow at an average of 4
percent a year until 2015. The impact of such growth on poverty depends very much on the
pattern of such growth and on the extent of its inequality during this period. Hanmer and
Naschold (2001) estimates that if the projected 4 percent growth is accompanied by low
inequality (i.e. Gini coefficients of less than 43), then the DAC target can easily be met. In
contrast, if the projected 4 percent growth is associated with high inequality, then by 2015
poverty rates will still be in the vicinity of 20 percent. In the high inequality scenario, the
DAC poverty target will only be met if the growth rate of income per capita reaches a
staggering 9 percent. Such a growth rate is without historical precedent—in the Asian
Tigers, income per capita grew by 5.5 percent per year over 1965-97—and it is unlikely to
be environmentally sustainable.
3. The inequality-growth nexus: economic theory and empirical results
In summary, it stretches credibility to believe that the development community’s targets
for poverty reduction can be met without addressing the high inequality that exists in so
many countries. Part of this conclusion depends on the relation between inequality and
growth or, more precisely, on the enhancing or depressing effects that high inequality (or
large rises in inequality) have on growth. Hereafter, we review the main theories in this7
field and their limitations, while in section IV we present the paradigm that, in our view,
most accurately represents reality in a variety of different country settings.
3.1 Post-Keynesian theories of inequality
A first group of theories of Keynesian inspiration focuses on the differential savings rates
of different economic agents in the context of models where growth is driven by capital
accumulation. In such models (Kaldor, 1960; Pasinetti, 1974), profit recipients have a
higher propensity to save than wage earners while high income wage earners have a higher
propensity to save than low income wage earners. Therefore an income distribution that
favours profits over wages facilitates a higher aggregate savings rate, faster capital
accumulation and growth. These theories reflect the emphasis of ‘old growth theory’ on
physical capital accumulation, a view that dominated development economics for years.
This approach implies that, at least during the first stages of growth, high earnings
inequality will be efficient, since it will maximise consumption by all social classes over
the long-term.
However, this theory has little empirical support. Econometric analysis of budget surveys
from developing countries shows that the marginal propensity to save is only weakly
influenced by income level, and that the latter is certainly not its most important
determinant (Cornia and Jerger, 1982). For instance, rural families consistently show
higher marginal propensities to save than their urban counterparts.1 Moreover, small and
medium-scale farmers have high savings rates because such self-employed households
include the maintenance and planned increase of their existing capital stock in their
consumption savings decisions. And the self-employed may be forced to save more by the
limited development of rural capital markets. Similar arguments are developed by Birdsall,
Sabot and Pickney (1996) who emphasise that poor households generate comparatively
high savings whenever they have an investment opportunity.
A further problem arises from the fact that the model at the basis of the old growth theory
disregards the growth impact of human capital. If we add to the savings of workers their
expenditures on health and education, it might appear that the workers do have higher
savings rates than the capitalists. Indeed, a poor family is likely to spend an important part
of an additional dollar of income in health and education, so effectively contributing more
than a rich family’s savings to capital accumulation. In summary, for all these reasons, the
conclusions of this class of models are largely discredited.
3.2 New political economy models
The last decade has seen considerably more analysis of the inequality-growth relationship,
leading to new policy conclusions. A first class of new models concludes that high initial
inequality damages growth as it leads to the election of governments that favour
redistribution through high marginal tax rates which in turn depress private investment and
growth (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994), The poorer the median
voter relative to the average, the higher the tax rate, and the lower investment and growth.
1 For an equal level of current income, the transitory component is higher for rural than urban incomes. As
most of the latter is saved, for the same level of total income, rural households save more than urban
households.8
So, the higher is initial inequality, the stronger is pressure to redistribute. Income
redistribution is therefore seen as harmful to growth. The key assumption is that private
investment has higher returns than public investment, so raising taxes to finance the latter
reduces overall growth.
However, these models are problematic. First, there is no evidence that inequality is
associated with redistribution. In fact, high inequality countries are more often than not
characterized by below average tax rates and regressive fiscal systems (Addison and
Rahman, 2001). Second, the data do not show a negative relation between taxation and
growth. If anything there is a positive relation between taxes and growth (Easterly and
Rebelo, 1993, Perotti 1996) due to the high returns to well designed public investments in
providing public goods. Finally, until recently, most developing and transitional countries
were not formal democracies holding elections, a fact that makes them unsuitable for
inclusion in empirical tests.
3.3 Capital market imperfections
In this class of new models, high initial inequality harms growth as it leads to slow human
capital formation and locks investments by the rich in low return activities. When capital
markets are imperfect, and investments in industry are lumpy, productive opportunities tend
to vary in line with the wealth distribution. With a limited ability to borrow, the poor cannot
finance education, buy a plot of land or open a business. Hence, they cannot realise their full
productive potential.
Such an outcome is not only inequitable, it is also inefficient. If production functions are
non-convex (i.e. if there are decreasing returns to investments), the absence of a deep and
well connected capital market concentrates investment in the hands of the rich and excludes
people who would engage in more productive activities. As noted by Aghion et al., (1999:
1622) ‘Redistributing wealth from the rich (whose marginal productivity of investment is
relatively low, due to decreasing returns to individual capital investment) to the poor (whose
marginal productivity of investment is relatively high, but who cannot invest more than their
limited endowments), would enhance aggregate productivity and therefore growth’. Thus,
unless the capital (credit and insurance) markets are deepened or the wealthy are taxed to
subsidize the public education of the poor, human capital accumulation remains lower than
under a more egalitarian regime and investment remains concentrated in low return activities.
3.4 Social conflicts and political instability
Another strand of the new literature argues that high initial inequality, and in particular
polarization, may force the poor into street protests, violent rioting and other actions that
cause uncertainty among investors, reduce the certainty of property rights, and increase
transaction costs (Venieris and Gupta, 1986). These models identify a negative linear
relation between initial asset inequality and growth. However, as Rodriguez (2000) notes, the
theoretical links between high inequality and political instability are somewhat
indeterminate. Although high inequality may push the poor into violence, at the same time it
provides the rich with greater resources to repress them.
In extreme cases, social tensions lead to conflicts which cause large drops in output, the
destruction of infrastructure and large human capital losses through death, displacement or9
forced migration. The number of domestic conflicts has risen steadily between 1980 and
1995 but started to drop mildly since then. When social polarization is profound and the
institutions of conflict management are weak, external shocks (attributable, for example, to
trade losses or financial contagion) are magnified by the distributional conflicts triggered
in their wake. Conflicts may arise in particular when ‘horizontal inequality’ (i.e. inequality
between religious, ethnic and social groups) is affected perceptibly because, for instance,
of the concentration of public subsidies or privatized assets in the hands of few interest
groups, thus altering a pre-existing and precarious political equilibrium (Nazfiger et al.,
1999).
In contrast to other classes of inequality models (in which growth might be less rapid in
relation to an abstract counterfactual), in this group of models the rich face clear and easily
monitorable losses and may thus have an incentive to secure their property rights and
reduce instability and the associated transactions costs by redistributing land and
educational opportunities and introducing minimum wages. These redistributive measures
may indeed be less costly and more pro-growth than the instability of high inequality.
However, such strategies are seldom observed in practice, and rebellion is the more
common outcome in high inequality societies (Central America, for example).
3.5 Policy distortions and government failure
High asset and income inequality may also reduce the scope for conducting a rational
economic policy. High assets and income inequality may infact lead to the adoption of
unsustainable macroeconomic policies by impeding other avenues for redistribution such
as land reform, taxation and subsidized human capital formation. In Peron’s Argentina and
Garcia’s Peru, governments sought to reduce social tensions through populist fiscal
expansion; the resulting inflation and the crowding out of private investment both
undermined growth. High inequality countries are also more likely to default on their
international debts than countries with more egalitarian income distributions, because they
are politically impelled to borrow rather than to tax. Again, Latin America in the 1980s
provides examples.
Alesina and Drazen (1993) suggest also that high inequality reduces the support for
fundamental growth enhancing structural change needed to resume growth. In an economy
characterized by two antagonistic groups, each of them may decide to delay the stabilization
in the hope that the other group will accept to carry most of the stabilization cost, even if the
aggregate gains outweigh the aggregate losses. The authors show that the time that elapses
before the stabilization is actually carried out by the loosing group increases together with
the inequality in the distribution of the gains of the reforms. A more equitable initial
distribution of income and assets is likely to lead to a more egalitarian distribution of the
gains and losses of stabilization, thus avoiding delays in stabilization. Rodrik (1998)
confirms these conclusions by providing evidence that societies characterized by high
inequality and poor institutions of conflict management (such as social insurance and
efficient government institutions) are more likely to have experienced growth collapses in the
1980s.
Finally, Birdsall (2000) emphasizes that high inequality undermines good public policy,
leads to government failure and inhibits growth. First, high inequality may reduces access to
a range of public services—such as law and order, the certainty of contracts and property10
rights, human capital formation. These are essential for growth and, in some cases, help to
reduce market failures (for example the public provision of education). As social distance
widens, the disparity of interests among social groups increases, taxation and the provision of
education and health services decline, residential segregation rises and political participation
and the efficacy of government institutions diminish. Second, high inequality also erodes
social cohesion, an essential factor in promoting the diffusion of information, in exerting
social control and in reducing transaction costs. Several of these effects emerged in the
countries in transition affected by rapid rises in social stratification. In these countries, rapid
increases in assets and income inequality strengthened the ability of the new élites to resist
taxation (Russia is a good example of this phenomenon) thus reducing the ability of the state
to ensure law and order, provide basic social services, and sustain the quality of government
institutions.
4. A new analytical framework
The previous section has reviewed the recent models of the relation between inequality and
growth and shown that, with the exception of post-Keynesian theories, this relation tends
to be monotonically negative; i.e. that higher inequality inhibits growth. Of these models,
the new political economy ones have been less successfully tested while those on political
instability and government failure may require further formal and empirical refinement. It
is also important to stress that most of these models have been tested on cross–section data
and that panel studies (which are rare) tend to reach the opposite conclusion, i.e. that more
inequality leads to higher growth. For instance, Forbes (2000) making use of panel data
and using a estimation technique different from that generally used so far identifies a
significant monotonically positive linear relation between inequality and growth. The
paper, however, does not provide any theoretical explanation of the empirical results
found. More generally, the way the panels are constructed tends to bias the sample towards
high income countries (which have longer time series and better data overall) and might be
affected by considerable measurement error, as the quality and coverage of the surveys
change considerably over time. Finally, the apparent divergence between the results of
cross sections versus panels may be explained by the fact that the panel estimates capture a
short run positive effect of inequality on growth, which is reversed in the long run.
As mentioned, however, both cross sectional and panel analysis identify linear monotonic
relationships between inequality and growth. Both linearity and monotonicity are however
counterintuitive from a theoretical point of view. It is difficult to believe that a shift in the
Gini coefficient from, say, 0.20 to 0.25 will have the same impact on economic
performance than an increase from 0.50 to 0.55. Likewise, the sign of the relation between
inequality and growth may change at substantially different levels of inequality.
The approach proposed in this paper differs in two ways from those described above: first,
at any one point in time, the relationship between economic growth and income inequality
is unlikely to be linear. Indeed, the relation is more likely to be concave, taking a form
described in Figure 2 (see also Figure 1 in Benabou, 1996). Banerjee and Duflo (2001)
arrive at similar conclusions about the concave shape of the inequality-growth relation
though their argument.11
Figure 2
Nonlinear relation between inequality and growth
In our approach, ‘too low’ or ‘too high’ inequality can be detrimental to growth, which
remains broadly invariant within a given efficiency range. We will also argue that for each
country there is likely to be a level (or range) of inequality that maximises the growth rate,
but that this will vary across countries depending on structural factors such as their
endowment of mineral resources or share of agriculture in total output. Two main
arguments are given for this. First, let us assume a latent ‘natural distribution of income
rewards’. Under conditions of equal opportunities, such a latent distribution depends
entirely on talent, effort and merit. (Such a distribution might take into account also a
socially accepted norm about the under-remuneration of the very talented ones and the
over-remuneration of the less talented but not of the lazy ones). Such a latent distribution is
unobserved by the policymaker but economic agents perceive whether their position in the
observed distribution is ‘fair’ i.e. if it broadly corresponds (or not) to their relative effort,
talent and merit.
The observed distribution of income often varies significantly from the latent one due to
market distortions or social norms. When the observed distribution is characterized by very
low levels of income inequality, i.e. when the wage and self-employment income
distribution is too compressed and does not adequately reflect different endowments of
talent, merit and effort, growth may be inhibited by loss of individual work incentives,
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life’. Soviet-type pay arrangements, for instance, appear to have caused serious work
disincentives, growing risk aversion, erosion of work discipline and poor performance
among both workers and managers. In Soviet-type firms, the relationship between the
wage rate on the one side and efforts, skill levels and prior investments of each workers in
human capital was weak or non-existent. The resulting earnings distribution was therefore
generally much more compressed than the one in the market economies or the latent wage
distribution. As noted by Phelps-Brown, ‘ ... the [lower wage dispersion of socialist
economies]..... arises mainly from a lower rise of income above the median, that is,
broadly: the more skilled manual occupations and still more the higher clerical, the
professional and the administrative, are paid less than in the West relatively to the bulk of
the manual workers‘ (1988: 303-4). Loss of incentives can also occur if workers are
subject to very high marginal tax rates (either via the state or by within-community
mechanisms), the depressing effect on growth of macro-economic instability, or some
combination of these mechanisms. Growth clearly suffers sharply if inequality falls below
I1 in Figure 2.
Conversely, as inequality rises there comes a point I* at which the growth-inequality
relationship starts to turn negative and, from inequality level I2 onwards, growth turns
sharply negative. Also in this case, the observed income distribution of income deviates
markedly from the latent distribution of rewards based on talent, merit and effort. This is
mainly the case because of the inequitable functioning of the labour, capital and product
markets, or because of unbalanced access to education, land, credit and insurance and, in
extreme cases, by sheer discrimination and segregation. This situation is also a cause of
important erosion of incentives which may lead to output contraction among the self-
employed, and to shirking and free-riding among dependent workers. In all cases where the
output of these workers is not easily monitorable (as in agriculture and most personal
services), lack of incentives entails the introduction of costly labour-monitoring
arrangements which further depress economic efficiency. The empirical literature offers a
number of microeconomic examples of such negative incentive effects. In a labour surplus
agriculture, for instance, high land concentration is generally associated with an inefficient
use of labour, shirking by agricultural labourers, high monitoring and supervision costs and,
as a result of all this, lower land yields. As a result, yields per hectare and total factor
productivity are higher among the smallholders who use larger amounts of family labour and
home produced inputs per hectare than large farms that rely on salaried labour, and face low
or zero shirking and supervision costs (Cornia, 1985).
A high degree of asset concentration and landlessness may force the poor to behave in ways
that are not in their long-term economic interests, thereby reducing growth. The problems of
over exploitation of forests, land erosion, and overgrazing observed in many developing
countries are often the result of an acute wealth concentration. With few employment
opportunities and limited access to good land, the poor are forced onto ecologically fragile
lands, such as mountain slopes or low rainfall areas, and their productivity falls as these
sparse natural resources are mined out.
Except in industrial firms characterised by substantial economies of scale, poor work
incentives due to wages below or near subsistence or large differentials not explained by
differences in endowments in human capital, personal ability and effort could erode work
incentives, increase shirking and supervision costs and reduce efficiency. This relation13
varies with firm size and across types of property rights. Large industrial firms relying on
salaried workers generally face higher shirking and supervision costs than small and
medium size firms where the distribution of rewards may be better aligned with that based
on effort and talent. In the latter, as well as in workers co-operatives which rely on peer
supervision to avoid free riding, incentive structures are generally better and labour
shirking is lower. But even these enterprises are not immune by incentive problems. For
instance, Banerjee et al. (1998, cited in Banerjee and Duflo, 2001) show, using panel data
from sugar cooperatives in India, that the most unequal cooperatives are the least
productive, with an output difference of more than 50 percent between the most and least
egalitarian cooperatives.
At a very high level of inequality, the erosion of ‘work incentives’ described above is often
accompanied also by the erosion of ‘the social contract’ as seen in Section 3 when
discussing the ‘social conflicts models’. These two explanations are not theoretically
incompatible. When the gap between the rich and the poor widens, rentseeking, predatory
and criminal activities rise, and the rich often increase their expropriation of the poor. This
increases transaction costs for business security and contract enforcement, while eroding
the security of property rights. For instance, the literature suggests a strong relation
between inequality and unemployment on the one side and the crime rate (homicide rate in
particular) on the other. Recorded homicide rates and crimes against the property have
recently increased sharply in the economies with traditionally high levels of inequality
(Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa) or where inequality has risen rapidly during the
last decade. Fajnzylber et al., (1999) find evidence to suggest that income inequality is
consistently associated with violence levels across countries. In turn, Bourguignon (1998)
and others have measured the growing economic cost imposed on society by such violence
in terms of lives lost, medical costs and resources diverted from productive uses to prevent
and repress criminal activities.
The shape of the inequality-growth relationship (G-I) will vary across countries depending
upon their natural resource endowment, the history (including colonial history) of past
policy decisions (and thus the accumulation and sectoral distribution of physical and
human capital) and other factors. Different groups of countries (A and B in Figure 3, for
instance) will have different (I-G)A and (I-G)B curves and different IA* and IB* inversion
points. For instance, in countries with large mineral resources the (I-G) curve tends to shift
to the right of the x-axis when compared with a manufacturing exporter. This implies that
countries have different development possibilities and that some could more easily reduce
poverty than others if their political processes allow.
Countries with a highly unequal income distribution that wish to accelerate poverty reduction
while avoiding any income redistribution must accelerate their (distributionally neutral)
growth rate. This will imply shifting upwards the I-G curve (Figure 4). Stepping on the
accelerator in this way reduces poverty at a faster rate (mean income rises at a faster rate). Of
course such a rise in growth may not be achievable due to lack of international finance, trade
barriers, and environmental damage. These are less of a constraint to poverty reduction when
redistribution is permitted, since the growth rate necessary to achieve a given target for
poverty reduction does not have to be as high if redistribution is ruled out. In a world in
which such growth barriers exist—for example an imperfect international credit market and
Northern protectionism—redistribution is critical.14
Figure 3
nonlinear inequality-growth (I-G) relations in countries A and B
Let us return to Figure 2 for a few further policy considerations. First, if inequality falls
below I1, a moderate surge in inequality can improve incentives, accelerate growth and
reduce poverty incidence. But an inequality level lower than I1 might be chosen if society
values lower inequality per se. Second, if the I-G curve is correctly represented then, given
the attainable growth rate of output compatible with the macroeconomic and
environmental constraints, any country that intends to maximize poverty reduction should
choose a lower level of inequality—I1 over I2 for example (Figure 2). I1 is associated with
a higher poverty alleviation elasticity than that of I2. The latter will be chosen only if some
class, ethnic group, or dictator prefers this distribution and is willing to sacrifice faster
poverty reduction to achieve it (an all too common outcome).
A key issue is the identification of specific vectors of policies associated with these two
inequality levels. Third, in the interval I1-I*, the inequality level that optimises poverty
reduction varies in line with the real shape of the curve. Further increases in inequality past
I1 are efficient as long as I PHR I G ¶ ¶ > ¶ ¶ / / , i.e the point at which the growth enhancing
effect of higher inequality is greater than the decline in the poverty alleviation elasticity of
growth due to a rise in inequality. Policy wise it is therefore necessary to identify for each
group of countries an ‘efficient inequality range’ within which both growth and poverty
reduction are maximised. It is equally necessary to identify policies which can help keep
inequality within the desired range (see section VI). Fourth, beyond I2 there is both growth
collapse and spreading poverty. Zaire under Mobutu’s dictatorship, the apartheid system in
South Africa and the latifundistas of Brazil chose a level of inequality well beyond I3—







Alternative poverty reduction patterns in a given country
5. An empirical analysis of the inequality-growth-poverty relationship
The review in Parts 3 and 4 indicates that of the various inequality-growth models, the one
which we consider the most appropriate is that which posits an asymmetric concave relation
between inequality and growth explained by work incentives and social cohesion. Its policy
implications are fundamentally different from those implicit in most other explanations: in
this model, at high levels of inequality, the rich have a strong incentive to reduce asset
inequality, increase public spending on education, and provide better work incentives; i.e.
measures which would entail changes in the current factoral distribution of income and in
the level of taxation. Failure to do so would increase supervision, transaction, security and
enforcement costs and could severely erode property rights.
Below we present an attempt at testing the inequality-growth relation discussed above. In
this regard, Table 5 describes the transition matrix of the Gini coefficients for 73 countries
between 1980 and the latest available year. It suggests that the Asian countries and the
countries of Western and Central Europe (that performed comparatively better) experienced
a moderate increase in inequality from low-moderate levels. In turn, the countries of the
former Soviet Union (whose output declined sharply over the last decade) witnessed the





American and African countries (which broadly stagnated or recorded only minimal growth)
experienced moderate inequality increases from very high levels.
Table 5
Transition matrix of Gini coefficients for 73 countries between 1980 and the latest
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Total 4 10 13 17 13 6 9 1 73
Source: Cornia with Kiiski (2001).
Notes: T = transition economies, O = old OECD, L = Latin America, R = Others. Gini coefficients have been
harmonized in terms of net income terms by adding 1 extra point to expenditure data and subtracting 5.5
points to gross income data.
We have therefore regressed by means of OLS with heteroschedastic correction the point-to
point changes in 73 Gini coefficients in Table 5 for developed, developing and transitional
countries for developed, developing and transitional countries over the period 1980-98 (or
most recent year) (DGini80-98) on the average GDP growth rate for this period (G80-98). The
data were interpolated using both a linear function (numerical results not shown) and a
quadratic function. As seen in Figure 5, the latter appears to fit far better the data than the
former which, in any case, also finds a negative relation between inequality and growth. The
regression identifies a concave relation statistically significant in (DGini80-98)
2 and explains a
satisfactory 57 percent of the total variance in growth performance. The linear term DGini80-
98, in contrast, is equal to zero.
G80-98 = 4.52 (11.67) - 0.0004 (0.00) DGini80-98 – 0.410 (8.69) (DGini80-98)
2
R-squared = 0.57, nobs =73
This estimate suggests that on average the countries that experienced large increases in
income inequality (from low or high initial levels) were likely to have suffered, ceteris
paribus, a slowdown in growth. There were, of course, important exceptions to this rule, as
illustrated by the case of outliers such as Kazakistan and China. In the 1990s, for instance,
China experienced fast growth despite a perceptible surge in inequality. The latter however17
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was due to an important extent to a rise in spatial inequality between the interior and the
coastal areas and between the urban and the rural areas which is less likely to erode
incentives and social cohesion over the medium term as compared to the case in which the
overall increase was due to a surge in social inequality within all main areas and regions.
Figure 5 also shows that the countries which either experienced a small increase or decrease
in inequality saw their growth rate only marginally affected. Only very few countries seem to
have experienced a modest decline in growth in correspondence with falls in Gini
coefficients of 5-10 points (generally from low levels).
Inspection of Figure 5 indicates however that the concave shape of the relation is due to a
good extent to the behaviour of the countries in transition (see the datapoints on the lower
right part of the chart) which—because of the one-off systemic changes entailed by the
transition—recorded much larger falls in GDP than other countries experiencing similar
rises in Gini coefficients. To control for this and similar systemic shocks—such as the
impact of the 1980s debt crisis in Latin America—we have expressed the average change in
GDP over 1980-98 as an index number (with 1980 GDP =100) and divided the value of the
national index numbers so obtained for the regional average for the same indicator. We
obtained in this way a standardized measure of growth (SG8-98) which takes into account the
varying country exposures to large systemic shocks. We then repeated the regression using
the same OLS procedure with heteroschedasticity correction, and found an overall
improvement in the estimate of the inequality-growth relation. To start with, the sign of the
variable DGgini80-98 has now the correct sign and its parameter is significant at the 83
percent level. In addition, the parameter of the quadratic term declined substantially in
relation to the prior formulation, a fact that reduces the steepness of the right arm of the
function. In contrast, the fit of the data worsened visibly.
SG80-98 = 1.040 (42.37 ) + 0.008 (1.38)DGini80-98 – 0.0012 (3.69) (DGini80-98)
2
R-squared = 0.18, nobs =78
Even after these corrections, our model still suffers from a number of specification and
estimation problems. First of all, equal increases in inequality from very different initial
levels of Gini are likely, ex ante, to generate different impacts. For instance, an increase of
10 points from an initial Gini level of 50 is likely to have a greater impact on incentives,
social stability and economic performance than a similar increase from an initial Gini of 30,
a fact that cannot be captured by the above specifications. Solution of this problem requires
adding the initial Gini coefficients to the regression or expressing the independent variable
in levels. The second problem concerns the determination of cauzation, a typical problem
when dealing with synchronous sectional data. This entails lagging the dependent variable, a
problem that could not be solved given the cross-sectional, point-to-point nature of the data
available.
To solve part of these problem we tested the hypothesis about the concavity of the relation
between inequality and growth on a panel of 325 observations for 12 developed nations
(Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, UK,
USA, ), 6 transition economies (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and
Slovakia) and 7 of the largest developing countries (Brazil, Chile, China, India, Pakistan,
South Africa and South Korea) for which at least 7 well spaced observations covering the
years 1960-98 were available in the WIID database. Several estimation techniques were
utilized to fit the relation G t =a+b G i n it –c G i n i t
2. All of them yielded similar and19
Figure 6
Relationship between annual percentage growth of GDP, constant 1995 US$ and the Gini coefficient for a sample of WIID countries

































































































































































































































































































Note: the high quality sample includes 325 observations on 12 developed, 6 transition, and 7 developing countries for various years between 1960-98. The sample was chosen to
reflect the average inequality and growth performance relation over the business cycle of each country by including only those series currently available in WIID that have 7
observations or more. (We still attempt to find more series to include.) A combination of series was deemed appropriate for Finland and United States for which ambiguity is
minimal. Several methods of regressions were run with similar, significant trend coefficients in all. The figure shows a GEE panel data estimator with country-specific effects
accounting for different average growth levels and gini concepts. The correlation within each country is estimated as 0.18. The country-specific heteroskedasticity about the
respective mean at the ends of the gini range is accounted by the coutry-specific effect and robust standard error estimator. In addition, the model is relatively robust to
misspecification of the covariance matrix (e.g. Diggle, Liang, and Zeger 1994), which is an important issue with inequality datasets.
1
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significant coefficients (not shown). Figure 6 presents the scatterplot of the above relation
fitted with the estimate of such quadratic function computed through a GEE panel data
estimator with country-specific effects accounting for different average growth levels and
Gini concepts. This estimation procedure is relatively robust to misspecification of the
covariance matrix, an important issue when dealing with inequality data sets. The concave
relation depicted in Figure 6 shows that the growth rate of GDP rises substantially (up to 5
points) when the Gini coefficient increases between 15 and 30. Within the range 35-45 of the
Gini coefficient the rate of growth is broadly invariant at around 5 percent a year. Between
45 and 50 Gini points the GDP growth rate declined by about one percentage point, while
another 4 percentage points of GDP growth vanished by the time the Gini coefficient reaches
60.
Similar results were arrived at by Barro (2000) who, after imposing all the necessary
controls, found a significant negative relation between inequality and growth in countries
with a GDP per capita of less than 2070 (in 1985 US dollars) and a significant positive
relation in countries with a GDP per capita higher than the threshold. The countries covered
by the first relation broadly corresponds to the high inequality countries in Figure 6 (for
which the relation is clearly negative) while the second corresponds to the low inequality
countries in Figure 6 (for which an increase in inequality is pro-growth).
The results in Figure 6 provide some support to the hypothesis that the relation between
inequality and growth is concave, but a number of essential improvements are still necessary.
Among them: the inclusion of controls for convergence in GDP and other unobserved effects
correlated with GDP/c the level of the GDP per capita at the beginning of the period
(GDP/c0); the introduction of a dummy variable for the FSU countries (FSU dummy) that, as
noted, can distort the estimates; the lagging of the dependent variable to solve the problem of
the direction of cauzation; the averaging of the variables over quinquennial periods to reduce
noise; and the broadening of the sample to include a greater number of developing countries.
Finally and most importantly, the model needs to test explicitly the specific incentives and
social mechanisms (wage structures, price ratios, social cohesion and so on) behind our
hypothetical concave relation I-G. Such detailed tests require however the availability of
microdatasets and long time series on inequality for the individual countries.
All in all, while the above empirical tests do not provide conclusive evidence of the validity
of the concave relation between inequality and growth, the results presented nevertheless
provide an encouragement to dig further in this direction. A more successful testing of this
relation in fact would substantially modify the political economy in this crucial area.
6. Policies for egalitarian growth and poverty reduction
Many variables affect the distribution of income and the incidence of poverty. It is not our
intention to review them all here. Instead, we confine ourselves to emphasising the
continuing importance of four ‘traditional’ causes of high and rising inequality, and
identifying five policies for addressing the ‘new’ causes of rising inequality that have
emerged over the last two decades, and which are associated with globalization and
liberalization (Cornia with Kiiski 2001 review the importance of the ‘old’ and ‘new’ causes
of inequality).21
6.1 Reversing traditional causes of rising inequality
Our earlier discussion highlighted the importance of avoiding two traps: insufficient
incentives, associated with overly compressed wage-differentials (the story of the former
Soviet Union) and, at the other end of the scale, social conflict associated with high and
rising income and asset inequality.
Implement agrarian reform in an incentive compatible and power compatible manner
The redistribution of large farms, plantations and state-run farms to the landless and to
poor smallholders can improve both equity and efficiency (as demonstrated by land
reforms in Kerala and East Asia). Moreover, wage inequality is high in countries with a
large agricultural sector and very unequal land ownership; unskilled wages are driven
down by the excess supply of landless labourers, a situation that is reversed by land reform
(Iglesias 1998: 17). So well designed land reform will reinforce, rather than reduce,
economic incentives and is therefore conducive to both higher growth and more poverty
reduction.
But progress in redistributing land in Central and South America has, with a few
exceptions, been disappointingly slow—one third of rural households remain landless
(Jazairy et al., 1992). Land reform in southern Africa is similarly slow, despite rising
tensions. Market and tax incentives to trigger a market-based redistribution of land are
therefore urgent. Land reform should also be ‘incentive compatible’, including the removal
of insurance and credit market failures which penalise smallholders, thereby raising their
rate of return from their access to new land (Binswanger and Deininger, 1997). At present
land taxes are low or non-existent in much of the developing world. Yet, large landowners
often benefit disproportionately from public investment in rural infrastructure, together
with the supply of water and power at less than its economic cost (evident in Latin
America as well as in southern Africa). In effect they receive large net subsidies, while
smallholders are often taxed.
Introducing progressive land taxes would reduce the net subsidy to large landowners as well
as the state’s current reliance on regressive indirect taxes. Land is a reasonable indicator of
wealth and it is visible, making it easier to tax than financial wealth (although accounting for
differences in land quality for tax purposes can be problematic and good land records are
essential). Since large farmers typically underuse their land—which can be sold to pay
taxes—the output effect of well administered land taxes need not be large. Land released into
the market can be purchased by community funds for the poor. Part of the tax revenue must
fund the infrastructure necessary to make resettlement schemes work.
Build human capital by refocusing public spending and mobilising more revenue through
progressive taxation.
The present distribution of public spending and taxation in many countries is neither
conducive to growth or poverty reduction. The fiscal system often distorts economic
incentives, and leads to an excessively high level of income inequality, damaging both
growth and poverty reduction.
The non-poor disproportionately benefit from public spending, particularly in Latin
America and SSA, their benefits far exceeding their taxes (van de Walle, 1998).22
Refocusing public spending on the poor (on basic health care, primary education, and safe
water and sanitation) and mobilising more revenue to fund basic services, both require
better state capacity in addition to political will. In Uganda only one third of every dollar
spent on primary education reaches schools as a result of budgeting and planning
problems, despite the government’s pro-poor commitment (Ablo and Reinikka, 1998).
Similarly, tax systems need institutional investment to provide the revenues to subsidize
human capital formation among the poor. Archaic tax institutions lead to substantial
avoidance and evasion of income and wealth taxes (land taxes, urban property taxes, and
capital-gains taxes of financial rents). Such taxes account for a mere 2.6 percent of total tax
revenue in developing countries as a whole (Burgess and Stern, 1993: 782). This forces an
over-reliance on regressive indirect taxes and user charges—a distortion encouraged by
short-term IMF programmes that impose unduly tight fiscal-deficit targets, and premature
capital-account liberalization (which facilitates tax evasion). Effective tax institutions lead
to lower income inequality, but high and rising inequality impedes their construction. The
wealthy block reform and corrupt tax authorities, and in doing so undermine support for
taxation among middle and low income groups, who rightly perceive the tax system to be
unfair—an effect that is very evident in EE-FSU (Pirttilä, 1999). Rising inequality is
unlikely to be reversed in Latin America or EE-FSU, without progressive taxation to meet
the effective demand of the poor for better human capital.
Correct market failures, in particular in the credit and insurance markets
Well designed micro-credit programmes are doing much to raise the incomes of the poor,
especially among rural women (Mosley and Hulme, 1998). Less attention has been given
to insurance (although improving micro-credit has some insurance characteristics). The
development of insurance markets for smallholders and micro-entrepreneurs would enable
them to insure against household-specific shocks (death of a family member, for example)
and covariant shocks affecting the entire community (drought and floods, for example). In
poor countries, both types of formal insurance are unavailable to most people. Insurers are
few, they possess imperfect information about risk, and gathering more information is
costly and unprofitable when average household income is low. Consequently, specific and
covariant shocks result in distressed asset-sales, and increased inequality.
Reduce regional and ethnic inequalities that cause poverty and social conflict
Racial and ethnic bias has been prevalent in public spending and public employment;
Guatemala, pre-independence Namibia, and apartheid South Africa are just three examples.
This has exacerbated horizontal inequality, leading to adverse growth effects through
social conflict. This has in turn contributed to both localised violence (Nigeria’s Delta
region is a current example) and genocide (on Rwanda see Uvin, 1996).
Large countries often combine a well developed modern sector with remote and very poor
backward areas, often inhabited by people of a specific ethnic origin (as in Brazil’s North-
East or Xinkiang in China). In Mexico, 80 percent of the indigenous population is poor,
while only 18 percent of Caucasians are poor (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 1994).
Infrastructure and education investment in poor regions is generally more effective in
reducing regional inequality than welfare transfers or fiscal incentives.23
6.2 New causes of inequality
Some of the recently observed rise in inequality is due to the decompression of wage-
differentials, and the restoration of incentives in both developing and transition economies.
But much is due to the way in which reforms have been conducted, in particular
stabilization programmes that have disproportionately reduced the incomes of the poor and
privatization programmes that have transferred assets to the non-poor on favourable terms.
The resulting rise in inequality endangers social peace, and will therefore be destructive of
both growth and poverty reduction.
Redesign stabilization to avoid sharp demand compression and protect pro-poor public
spending
Stabilization can be undertaken in different ways, some of which are more protective of the
poor than others—for example reducing the fiscal deficit by mobilising more public
revenue to maintain pro-poor public spending. The sharp demand compression undertaken
under orthodox programmes to reduce inflation rapidly to single digits has no positive
growth effect—indeed the cross-country evidence shows that driving inflation below 40
percent has no discernible benefit for growth (Bruno and Easterly, 1998). But such sharp
stabilization does adversely affect income inequality and poverty in developing countries
where wages are downwardly flexible (in contrast to real wage stickiness in developed
countries) and social safety nets are often weak or non-existent. Wages therefore fall faster
than GDP per capita and profits, the wage share declines and the inequality of the size
distribution of income increases. In their country sample, Bourguignon and Morisson
(1992) found evidence of a disequalizing trend in all the countries that had undertaken
stabilization and structural adjustment programmes, with the exception of Malaysia.
Invest in basic and technical education to raise the supply of skilled labour and thus
spread the benefits of trade liberalization and technology investment more widely
Globalization, and the spread of new technologies (especially in IT), has made education
the key instrument for development. Latin America (and South Africa) must emulate, and
surpass, East Asia’s success in human capital investment if they wish to achieve global
competitiveness and pro-poor growth—but they will not achieve such investment without
progressive revenue mobilization to increase the public funding of education. Without such
public investment, wage-inequality will remain high, reflecting the concentration of the
returns to education among a narrow band of the population, that can finance its human
capital investment through private means.
Traditionally, openness to trade was held to reduce inequality; the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem predicts that trade liberalization favours the most abundant factor, which is
unskilled labour in developing countries. And, the rapid egalitarian growth of East Asia
over the last 30 years seemed to bear this out. Bourguignon and Morisson (1992) found
that the phased removal of trade protection is likely to improve income distribution.
But the relationship between trade openness and inequality has changed; import
liberalization raises the demand for skills and reduces the demand for unskilled labour as
the cost of imported technology falls. Wood (1997) argues that trade liberalization
increases inequality in countries importing goods intensive in skilled-labour and improves
it in countries exporting such goods. Nine case studies from Latin America show that trade24
liberalization now favours skilled workers (Robbins, 1996). In Mexico, wage inequality
rose sharply after the 1985 trade liberalization, thus reversing a declining trend, although
there are clearly other factors at work including declining union strength (Harrison and
Hanson, 1999). More generally, evidence for Colombia, Mexico and Taiwan shows that
technology investment widens wage-inequality (Tan and Batra, 1997).
Skills are widely distributed in Asia’s emerging economies (although Thailand is lagging),
but Latin America’s underinvestment in primary education limits the gains to the poor
from trade and associated technological investment. Moreover, Latin America faces strong
competition from the big five low-income countries (Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia
and Pakistan) which account for over half the unskilled workers of the developing world.
These countries were largely closed to trade when East Asia began its export-led growth in
the 1960s, therefore enjoying an advantage in labour-intensive exports not now available to
Latin Americans. Thus, Latin America has shifted increasingly to skill-intensive exports
after opening to trade in the 1990s. Its growth in trade therefore has very different
implications for poverty and inequality than the historical experience of East Asia.
The last two decades have seen a narrowing of the available menu of policy options. The
policies available to East Asia in the 1960s are largely inaccessible to today’s developing
economies. East Asian export growth was achieved by increasing incentives to exporters
(through subsidies) while maintaining import protection. International trade agreements
today are much less tolerant of import protection and industrial subsidies than they were in
the 1960s. Since the 1980s, most of the opening to trade in Latin America (and elsewhere)
has involved import liberalization and cutbacks in export subsidies. The two approaches to
opening up are formally equivalent, but they have very different consequences for growth,
skill demand and thus inequality and poverty (see Wood, 1997). This is not to argue for a
reversion to trade protection and extensive subsidy; in comparison to East Asia the Latin
American state proved itself incapable of using these instruments wisely. But it does add
even more weight to investment in human capital as a key instrument for growth and
poverty reduction.
Reduce the occurrence of financial crises and thereby avoid sharp recession-induced rises
in inequality.
Premature financial liberalization, in the context of under-investment in prudential
financial regulation, has been the weak point in emerging economies (notably Asia and
Latin America), but is also evident in low-income countries (Uganda for example).
Financial crises have become more frequent over the last two decades due to an increase in
domestic financial liberalization, interacting with increased global capital flows (Stiglitz,
1998a). This led to the proposal (just before the Asian crisis) to change the IMF’s mandate
to enforce capital-account opening. This was despite the evidence that openness to short-
term capital flows combined with weak financial supervision is a recipe for macro-
economic and social disaster (Stiglitz, 1999).
Financial crisis has large social costs. Output collapse is especially dangerous in divided
societies with large horizontal inequalities, which tend to worsen during crisis—as
Indonesia demonstrates. Recession forces the poor to sell their assets and reduces their
human capital, thereby lowering the poverty elasticity of long-term growth. Inequality also
rises due to the contraction of wage income. Mexico’s 1995 crisis contributed to a rise in25
the Gini from 42 in the mid 1980s to nearly 50 in the 1990s (WIID), and real wages had
not returned to their pre-crisis levels by 1999. More generally, Diwan (1999: 19) finds that
the labour share usually falls sharply following a financial crisis, recovering only partially
in subsequent years:
Perhaps because labour is less mobile than capital, it ends up forced to bear a large
share of these asset losses (in the sense of transferring parts of its income to another
group). There is strong evidence of this happening. Crises are resolved when
workers end up bearing large costs that resemble bail-outs of (financial) capital. We
estimate that the total losses to labor, from the beginning to the end of a crisis,
amounts on average to 20 percentage points of GDP.
The extent of the rise in inequality and poverty also depends on whether social safety nets
exist. In Latin America and Asia financial crises raised inequality in 73 and 62 percent of
the cases respectively, while in Finland and Norway—both of which have strong social
safety nets—inequality did not rise during or after their financial crises of the late
1980s/early 1990s (Galbraith, 1999). In Mexico, the tortilla subsidy (which cost US$400
million annually) was withdrawn in 1999 in part to pay for a US$65 billion bail out of the
banks, and their owners. The social benefits of reducing output volatility are therefore
considerable. IDB estimates that in Latin America, a three percentage point reduction in
the volatility of real GDP growth would reduce the Gini coefficient by about 2 percentage
points (IDB, 1998: 100). In summary, there are strong reasons to reduce the occurrence of
recessions caused by distress in the financial sector.
In the absence of international action, national action must be taken. This includes
strengthening prudential financial regulation, as well as the introduction of controls on
destabilizing short-term capital flows. These could prevent labour from bearing all of the
brunt of financial/currency crises. As Diwan (1999: 30) concludes: ‘... in a socially fragile
situation, there may be an important role for capital control in imprisoning financial capital
and allowing better sharing of the burden of adjustment ...’
Reduce wage inequality, increase social cohesion, and raise labour productivity by means
of minimum wages and investment in labour-market institutions.
Trade and capital account liberalization have weakened the bargaining power of unskilled
labour across both developed and developing countries (ILO, 1996; van der Hoeven,
1999). This has played an important role in raising wage inequality, as has the associated
weakening—and in some cases the destruction of—institutions of collective bargaining,
and their influence over wages and working conditions. Trade unions are one of the
strongest institutions of civil society and have played a key role in achieving and sustaining
democratic transitions (for example Brazil, Poland, and South Africa). Both social capital
and democracy have powerful benefits for both poverty reduction and economic growth;
thus the restoration of labour-market institutions to mediate the relationship between
capital and labour is crucial to long-term social progress as well as to the reduction of
poverty through income redistribution. Moreover, minimum wage legislation remains
limited in coverage, and in many cases, especially in SSA, statutory levels of minimum
wages have been left unadjusted, leading to their decline in real terms. When labour market
monopolies exist—for example in plantation agriculture or when a single larger employer
dominates a region’s labour market (common in transition economies)—minimum wage26
legislation is especially important in achieving both efficient and equitable labour-market
outcomes.
Regulate privatized enterprises to ensure that shareholders do not gain to the disadvantage
of poor consumers
Although ostensibly aimed at improving overall economic efficiency, privatization’s
inception and pace are more often dictated by budgetary pressures including IMF fiscal
conditionality. If privatization raises overall economic efficiency then it can generate more
social resources to transfer to the poor. Realising such social gains, however, depends upon
the careful design of privatization itself, effective post-privatization regulation to protect
the public interest, and investment in an appropriate legal framework. The story of how
insiders took advantage of weak corporate governance and the absence of regulation to
asset-strip Russia’s economy is now well known. In addition to the highly regressive asset
redistribution, insider privatization failed to raise economic efficiency—Russia’s output
collapsed—resulting in fewer, not more, social resources for use in poverty reduction. The
BWIs have belatedly woken up to the problem—see for instance (IMF, 1999) on the
Kyrgyz Republic. Greater attention to the institutional design of privatization, and greater
caution in its use, is now part of the post-Washington Consensus (Stiglitz, 1998b, 1999)—
but this is now irrelevant to much of the EE-FSU given the large-scale privatization that
has already occurred.
Inequality and poverty outcomes depend upon privatization’s speed, the nature of
compensatory programmes (if any) for the unemployed, and whether macro-economic
policy is expansionary thereby easing the absorption of state employees into private
employment without sharp wage declines. The Czech Republic maintained economic
growth in the 1990s (although with a financial crisis along the way), thereby easing
privatization’s employment impact (Stodder, 1998). As a result, and taking account of the
progressive tax and transfer system, the Czech Republic stands out as a transition economy
with a limited increase in inequality and poverty; WIID shows a rise in the Gini from about
20 in 1990 to a range of 23 to 27 (less than the Gini, 30-32, of the egalitarian Netherlands).
Economic growth, combined with only a small rise in inequality, has limited the rise in
absolute poverty; this shows a smaller increase than in either Hungary or Poland.2 China’s
more gradual privatization in the context of high growth has eased the employment impact
(Benziger, 1998). However, China’s recent acceleration in its privatization programme is
taking place in a slowing economy, and privatization’s social costs will accordingly be
more difficult to manage.
Privatization is now a ‘done deal’ in many countries. So, regulation is the key entry point
for getting equity objectives into policy. Privatized utilities illustrate the issues. When
state-owned utilities have been unable to maintain infrastructure investment, the service
access of the poor may improve after privatization if substantial private capital is invested.
But, in practice the service provided by privatised utilities to the poor has been mixed;
private companies may focus on the most profitable areas, leaving the poor, particularly in
2 The poverty headcount measure rises from 0 percent (1987-88) to less than 1 percent (1993-95) in the
Czech Republic. This measure rises from 1 to 4 percent, and from 6 to 20 percent in Hungary and Poland
respectively (Milanovic, 1998: 68).27
rural areas, with the worst access and services. Regulation is therefore critical but is very
weak in most transition economies, as elsewhere in the developing world.
Various regulatory mechanisms and subsidies to ensure service delivery to the poor can be
deployed, although their relative effectiveness remains uncertain (Sheshinski and López-
Calva, 1999). ‘Universal service obligations’ that require the private service-deliverer to
provide access to all groups within their area of concession regardless of income level may
be promising (Chisari et al., 1997). However, the poor may be more than willing to pay for
the new service, but still unable to pay. Thus a portion of privatization revenues should be
earmarked for livelihood projects, thus raising the ability of the poor to pay for the new
services.
7. Conclusions
This paper has argued that while excessive egalitarianism stifles incentives and thus
poverty reduction through growth, excessive inequality has similar and more pronounced
effects. Certainly, many economies have reached levels of inequality that are neither
economically efficient nor conducive to rapid poverty reduction and social stability.
Addressing this problem requires ‘traditional’ measures of redistribution—well designed
land reform and pro-poor public spending in particular. Although important, especially for
the rural poor, these policies will not alter some of the new causes of the recent rise in
inequality. These include the systematic compression of the labour share; the erosion of
labour institutions; insider privatization; the rise in financial rents; the reduced
redistributive role of the tax and transfer system; and distorted regional development
policies. Thus to accelerate poverty reduction the post-Washington Consensus must give
greater attention to the new causes of rising inequality.
The world economy has changed radically over the last two decades. New economies have
become major players in international trade and investment, restrictions on capital flows
have been drastically reduced, liberalization and privatization has spread across the
developing and formerly-socialist worlds, and the effects of the IT revolution and
democratization are still unfolding. While some of these changes are undoubtedly welfare
improving, the implications for income distribution and poverty are ambiguous, and not
always benign. Certainly, the last twenty years has seen sharp rises in inequality in many
countries, particularly in the transition economies and in Latin America. This has made the
task of poverty reduction more difficult and action to contain, and reduce, the rise in
inequality is necessary to speed up poverty reduction.
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